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at 70:
P
T i m e for retirement.
By Adam C. Pritchard
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s one grows older, birthdays gradually shift from being
celebratory events to more reflective occasions. One's
40tl1 birthday is commemorated rather differently from one's
2 lst, which is, in turn, celebrated quite differently from one's
first. After a certain point, the individual birthdays become less
important and it is the milestone years to whch we pay particular
attention. Sadly for entities like the Securities and Exchange
Commission, it is only the milestone years (the ones ending in five
or zero, for some reason), that draw any attention at all. No one
held a conference to celebrate the SEC's 67th anniversary. Clearly
the SEC is not getting its fair share of chocolate cake.
Eventually the birthdays come to be recognitions of the fact
that you are still around. Survival, not moving ahead in life,
becomes the notable fact. And so it is with the SEC. It has now
been 70 years since Congress created the SEC in the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.We are still short of the gold standard
for human survival -- 100 years -but 70 is not bad. The SEC
today looks poised to outlast even the longest human life span.
It has largely moved beyond the tasks that dominated much of
its early agenda -the taming of the NewYork Stock Exchange,
the reform of corporate bankruptcies and public utilities -and
ensconced itself firmly as the arbiter of corporate disclosure and
the primary enforcer of anti-fraud rules relating to the purchase
and sale of securities. And the perceived importance of those
latter-day functions, and thus, the SEC's prospects for survival,
have only increased of late, reinforced by t h e j n de sicle accounting
scandals and corporate abuses. The list is by now familiar
- Enron, WorldCom,Tyco, Adelphia, Global Crossing, etc., etc.
- and that drumbeat of scandal has made the SEC once again the
fair-haired boy of the Congress and the White House. The SEC
was given a raft of new enforcement tools by Congress in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act as politicians fell over themselves to get tough
on corporate crime in the wake of the collapse of the tech bubble.
The SEC -most anxious not to disappoint -has responded to
this groundswell of support with a flurry of rulemalong aimed
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at accountants, analysts and audit committees, just to covcr thc
"A1's. I have not run across any rules directcd toward the "Z1's, but

\+,isdom concerning the essential role of the SEC in protecting
the integrity of the financial markets has only been ~tren~gthened

I am sure that is only because the agcncy has not gotten that far

by the aforementioned accounting scandals although the certainty

yct. So thc SEC clearly shows no interest in slowing down and
taking it casy as it reaches its advanced years. A more telling sign

that the U.S. markets are the best in the \vorld may have been
shaken a bit.
Am I simply tilting at the same windmills as Macey! I think

of continued vitality at thc SEC is that thc customary complaints
about how the agency docs not have nearly enough resources to
adequately do its job of protecting the integrity of our financial

not. Whereas Macey seemed intent on affirmatively lulling off the

h
markets have given way to an extraordinary situation in ~ h c the
agency finds itself unable to spend all of the money allocated to

ablv more modest.To return to the metaphor of my title, I think
retirement would suffice; capital punishment of the kind proposed

it by Congress (which v7asin turn, more than the White House
aqked for). This is a most unusual problem for a bureaucracy to
have. In sum, business is booming at the SEC.

bv Macey is a bit extreme. By retirement, I mean the abolition of

How odd thcn, the suscstion of my title that it might be time

SEC and its essential functions, my proposal is (I think), consider-

the SEC and the transfer of its essential functions to the executive
branch. Specifically, 1 propose transferring the SEC's r e p l a tory function to the Treasury Department and its enforcement

for the SEC's retirement. Retirement can be made mandatory
for persons in "high policymalung position[s]" after the age of 65,

function to the Justice Department, while leaving largely intact
the enforcement functions of the state securities authorities and

and the SEC certainly qualifies as a polic~maker.But no one is
pushing the SEC toward retirement. \Veil, almost no one - I am

the self-reLplatory organizations such as the National Association
of Securities Dealers (NASD), the NewYork Stock Eschange

not the first to s u g e s t that the time has come to put the SEC out
to pasture. Jon Macey suggested 10 years ago at a coinmemora-

(NYSE), and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB).
Old \vine in ne\\- bottlcs? Again, I think not. Separating the

tion of the bureau's 60th annivcrsary that the SEC had become
"ob~oletc'~
and that it \\.as time to lull it off. The cfficicncy of the
financial markets, Macey argucd, has increased "as technolop

SEC's replatory function from its enforcement function proinises
to impro\.e the effectiveness and efficiency of both. My main

had de~relopcdand as market professionals who compete to find

point goes to accountabilitv. Although it is traditionally argued

inispriced securitics have emerged in hugc numbcrs." Moreover,
"the oppoi-tunitics for inanipulation and fraud are probably fewer

branch rather than an independent agency is desirable because

now than at any time in histol-y" and "rules against fraud csistcd
long before there was an SEC." Finally the development of

it increases accountability I think that the shift of authoritv I
propose might diminish accountabilitv, at least of a ccrtain sort.

portfolio thcory and capital asset pricing models had eliminated
divcrsifiablc risks from the investmcnt process. Macey's conclu-

The accountability that I believe should be diminished is the SEC's
accountability to Congress. Because the SEC is an "independent"

sion: "Markct forccs and csogcnous technological changcs . . .
have obviatcd any ~ ~ u h linterest
ic
justification for thc SEC that ma!

agency, the President's influence over thc agency is limited to the
abilitv to nominate commissioners, and even that power is subject

havc existed."
Macey's argument was a non-starter then. Thc conventional
~visdornhcld that "thc SEC is onc important rcason wh\r thc
sccuritics industrv is in so much hctter shape than othcr financial
ser\.icc industries, and wh\r U.S. securities markets are the
best securitics markets in thc ~\.orld."The causal connection
bctvvccn thc cxistence of thc SEC and tllc strcngth of the U.S.

that placing administrati\-e responsibilities within the esecutive

to the Senate's confirmation authority The SEC's status as an
"independent" agency leaves it vulnerable to the political \vhlns
of kcv legislators. That \vulnei-ability fuels the cvclical pattern
of neglect and hytcrical overreaction that typifics securities
regulation emanating from both thc SEC and Congress. Moving
securities regulation to the eaecutivc branch might hclp insulate
thc field from this dcstructive pattern. In addition, congressional

capital markets was difficult to pinpoint, but thc convcntio~al

oversight docs littlc to help overcome the SEC's susccptibilitv

wisdom did not qucstion its existence. And that convcntiondl

to groupthink and confirmation hias. Morcovcr, moving securiLQN Summer ZOOS
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ties regulation to the executive branch might open up the field to
more di\-erse perspectives. More executive branch involvement
might also encourage securities regulators to move beyond their
fixation with promulgating new disclosure requirements. Finally,
disrupting the close connection between the SEC and Congress
might disrupt - at the margin -the disproportionate influence
that interest groups exert over securities regulation. I should
begin with a caution: I do not mean to overstate my case. The SEC
should certainly not be singled out as an underperformer among
regulatory agencies. It enjoys the reputation as being one of the
more competent of the administrative agencies and that reputation is, in my vie\?; largely warranted. My point is a more modest
one: Institutions matter in reLplatory policy. In the field of securities regulation at least, the investing public is not well served
by vesting authority in an independent agency. I do not believe
that securities regulation in the United States has been a failure,
but that does not mean that we are incapable of doing better. We
might do better by placing the responsibility for the development
of securities regulation and the enforcement of those rules in the
executive branch.
Where has the SEC fallen short?The list should be a familiar
one for most observers of securities law; I do not offer it as
original. Nor is it intended to be comprehensive; others will have
their own favorite examples of SEC failure. My purpose here is
s
merely to show that the SEC's interaction with Congress ~ l a y an
important role in explaining a range of familiar shortcomings.

The single most powerful influence on replatory policy is
the urge to protect defrauded investors in the wake of the bull
market. To be sure, some investors are defrauded as a bull market
is climbing ever higher, but the rising tide tends to obscure the
shenanigans as everyone focuses on the profits that they are piling
up on paper. Congressmen (at least some of them) recoLpize in
the abstract that encouraging liquid securities markets will facilitate capital formation, and thus, economic growth. ReLplation
may be necessary to secure that liquidity. That interest, however,
is not high on the list of legislative priorities during bull markets
when investors' primary focus is counting their gains and chasing
the next "sure thing." During these periods, Congress is happy to
leave the day-to-day regulating to the SEC, which is, after all, the
expert agency.
Bear markets, however, inevitably follow bull markets.
Corporate mismanagement and corruption can be obscured by
rising stock prices in a bull market, but the dirty laundry has
a way of surfacing in bear markets.The bad news flushes out
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dissatisfied investors who clamor for government intervention.
Politicians who happily ignored cver-climbing stock markets
become profoundly interested in disclosure policy when the
financial news migrates from the business page of the newspaper
to the front page. The accounting scandal dulour provides an
opportunity to fulminate, hold a series of show trials called
"legislative hearings" to rake some greedy businessmen over the
coals, and then enact legislation to protect "investor confidence."
Indeed, that is the genesis of the Exchange Act, which garnered
much of its legislative momentum from the legislative proceedings orchestrated by Franklin Roosevelt's henchman, Ferdinand
Pecora. The recent spectacle of politicians falling all over themselves to outdo each other in "getting tough on corporate crime"
is only the latest chapter of political overreaction to the fallout
of corruption revealed by a bear market. How quickly the winds
shfted in Washington when Enron and WorldCom collapsed
under the weight of their "creative" accounting. Congress and
the SEC, previously inert, have responded to public outrage over
corporate shenanigans by proposing a laundry list of new laws
and regulations to crack do\\m on corporate abuses. For example,
after styrmeing regulation of auditor independence during the bull
market, Congress quickly shifted course on the question with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposing an array of restrictions on services
by accounting firms to their audtor clients.
There may be more than political opportunism at work here.
The availability heuristic is also in play, as both the SEC and
Congress focus too narrowly on recent and immediately available
information. Regulators may also be too quick to see a pattern in
a series of events that are in fact random. For example, a handful
of salient accounting scandals may be construed as a corporate
qovernance crisis. In the face of a crisis, regulatory approaches
seem to make sense when they previously had no support whatsoever. Immediately prior to the Enron scandal, CEO certification of financial statements was nowhere to be found on the SEC
list of policy initiatives. It was hardly news that CEOs sometimes
fudge the numbers, occasionally on a grand scale. Nonetheless,
CEO certification - like other aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
- would not have been adopted without the external pressure
to react to a supposed crisis. Similarly, before the Enron scandal
broke, Capitol Hill had no interest in safeguarding the role that
analysts o lay as gatekeepcrs in the securities markets. After the
scandal, legislators were baying for regulatory rcform, some of
them -perhaps - even sincerely. It seems unlikely that this shift
on the part of l a ~ ~ m a k ecould
rs
represent a rational response to
new jnformation. More likely, it is a symptom of the availability
heuristic at work. Also at work is the hindsight bias, as SEC regulators and their congressional overlords place too much weight
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on the probability of past events that actually occurred relative
to those that did not. Enron was "obviously" a disaster waiting
to happen -how odd that so few recoLgnizedit before disaster
struck.
And of course these biases interact in perverse ways with
the aforementioned political imperative to respond to the latest
headlines. Opportunistic politicians may take advantage of the
biases of the electorate, playing up recent instances of fraud
to gain electoral support. Analyst independence only became
a priority when the NewYork state attorney general revealed
incriminating internal e-mails from Merrill L ~ c hOnly
.
after
Enron and WorldCom moved accounting from the business
page to the front page was auditor independence a compelling need. The SEC did nothing to discourage the notion that
the small number of companies implicated in these scandals
reflected a broader pattern, a statistically very dubious proposition (following the "law" of small numbers). Notwithstanding
this dubious empirical foundation, once this story took hold
alternative explanations were pushed aside. Just as curious as
the (over)-reaction to the "analyst affair" was the lack of reform
effort prior to the scandal. The airing of the investment bank's
dirty laundry provided no new information on the conflicts of
interest that plague that business model. The SEC - and indeed,
most investors -- have long known that analyst ratings are skewed
toward optimism and that auditors often provide non-au&ting
services to their clients.
Worse yet, some of the abuses that Congress has lately seen
fit to regulate can be traced back, not to a lack of regulation, but
rather, laxity in enforcement. During the bull market, Congress
had more important uses for the taxes generated from securities transactions than policing the securities markets. An understaffed Securities and Exchange Commission long ago gave up
periodic review of company filings because it had other priorities.
Accounting fraud ranked low on the enforcement agenda, trailing
the vendetta against insider traders and the pursuit of teenagers
engaged in Internet stock scams. Only in the late 1990s did the
SEC make financial reporting a priority. Once financials were put
under the microscope, the agency claimed itself to be shocked
to find that chief financial officers were playing fast and loose
with the numbers. Once the SEC started loohng at the books,
the number of restatements skyrocketed and we had a "deluge of
restatements" on our hands (at least in the light of the particularly
salient accounting scandals making the front pages).
The "deluge" now seems to have abated somewhat, but the
passage of the Sarbanes-Odey Act has been followed up by an
o r u of rulemaking that shows no signs of subsiding anytime
soon. The SEC, seeing a window of opportunity, looks for areas

in which to expand its sphere of influence while the public still
worries over the specter of massive fraud. The regulation of hedge
funds looks to be the next territory to conquer.
Congress, however, sho\vs certain signs of restlessness. As the
echoes of those accounting shenanigans begin to fade, various
members of Congress have been making threatening noises on
the question of the proper accounting treatment of options. The
loss to public corporations of beefed-up internal controls is called
into question. Scandal-driven reform followed by political neglect
has been a recurring pattern in the securities markets. Although
scandals may be needed to focus dispersed lawmakers' collective will, they often result in overreaction, ~articularlyif political
entrepreneurs succeed in framing the issue in a way that resonates
with the electorate.
That dynamic means that demands for financial market regulation will arise in times of crisis, particularly if that crisis spills
over into the real economy. Crisis, however, does not create the
ideal environment for developing balanced, cost-effective policy
interventions. Politicians will want to "do something," even if
the proposed something may prove to be costly, ineffective, or
counterproductive. SEC Commissioners and &vision heads will
be called to the carpet by legislators looking to hold someone
accountable for the market decline. Commissioners and staffers
tend not to enjoy such encounters. Not being paid very well
(relative to their alternative employment opportunities), they
expect to at least lead a quiet life, which leads them to a strong
preference for conservatism in regulation. From the bureaucrat's
perspective, the optimal number of regulatory failures is zero.
If a rule makes an incremental contribution to the avoidance of
a future crisis, government regulators may be quick to see the
rule's wisdom, discounting its costs. Those costs will be born
bv investors generally, in the form of small reductions in their
investment returns and disclosure documents that bury important
information in a sea of minutia. Those costs are sufficiently diffuse
that they are unllkely to generate a groundswell for regulatory
reform. Thus, the cumulative effect of regulation in response to
crisis is a ratchet effect pushing towal-d greater, more intrusive
regulation and greater dead-weight costs for investors.
It may take multiple crises to push government regulations
to the point where they become a serious drag on the financial
markets, but having reached that point, it becomes very difficult
to turn the ship of state toward less regulation. Staffers at the SEC
have more important tasks to worry about than figuring out which
regulations can be discarded - when is the last time anyone at
the SEC sat down looking for items to cut k o m Replation S-K?
Do investors in today's environment really need a discussion of
the impact of inflation on a company's operations?
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Worse yet, once in place, legislation and regulations often take
on a life of their own. It took Congress over six decades to get
around t o repealing the Glass-Steagall Act, for example, enacted
in response t o the crisis of the Great Depression. Legislators may
accept the \rrisdom of prior legislation uncritically, operating
under a confirmation bias. Interest groups that benefit from the
regulatory apparatus will fight hard t o preserve their prerogatives.
Deregulation requires a mammoth (and unusual) mustering of
political will. Without anv recent information of equal salience
nonscandals tend not t o generate newspaper headlines -no
impetus will develop t o remove the protective legislation.
O n e could argue that this regulatory approach makes sense
-- put out fires and "don't fix what ain't broke." It may be costly
to experiment with new regulations (or less regulation) without
the threat of a perceived and immediate loss to investors. But
this generalization cannot always be true. Sometimes rationalizing regulation, such as loosening up restrictions on forwardlooking disclosure, may benefit both issuers and investors. The
continued bias toward reactive reform t o the securities laws
represents a verv dubious presumption in favor of the status quo.

--

That presumption can only be overcome, it seems, by a spate
of headlines. This political cycling between ~ o l i c i e sof benign
neglect and hvsterical overreaction suggests that the SEC, far from
serving as a shelter against the vagaries of the political winds, acts
more like a weathervane, s~rringingwildly with the change in the
political atmosphere.

6 6 @ ~ ~ o ~ x p t hamil
i n ~ci ~
9 9n f i ~ ~ m a t bias
ion~
I turn now from the SEC's susceptibility to external stimuli
t o its internal thought processes. Few observers \vould sugqest
that there is a great deal of diversity of thought at the SEC. The
SEC is known for its strong organizational culture. Often praised
as hard-working and dedicated, the mission of "investor protection" is taken to heart by virtually all SEC staffers. As former SEC
Chairman Arthur Lcvitt put it: "Investor protection is our legal
mandate. Investor protection is our moral responsibility. Investor
protection is my top personal priority." This ethos is no doubt
reinforced by self-selection among thosc seeking SEC cmployment.Thc pcople who pursue carecrs as regulators and enforcement officials may bc individuals with heightened senses of justice
and fairness. This is not entirely a bad thing. Such traits may lead
regulators to work hard for rclatively low pay. Such a culture
helps maintain morale and focuses SEC staffers on the task of
regulating the capital markets.
Dcspite thcse benefits, the strong investor protection culture
within the SEC may also lead to "groupthink." Groupthink occurs
when individuals comc to identify with thc organization and
58
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accept its mission uncriticallv duc to their percci\~ctlmembership in the group. Although an individual mav assess a particular
decision critically, members of a group dcfcr to the consensus.
Groupthink will also tcnd to rcducc the rangc of hypothcscs
that an organization considers when faced with a prohlem.
Homogeneous groups like the self-selected SEC staffers arc
particularly susceptible to the confirmation bias and arc pcrhaps
more likely to engage in self-serving inferences (to the extent that
all the staffers have a homogeneous interest). Once thc SEC has
committed to a policy initiative through a rulemalung proposal
- thereby tentatively committing to thc "group" - feedback on
the proposal may get less weight than it would have if thc information had been solicited before the SEC fixated upon a specific
proposal.
Groupthink mav also manifest itself in the SEC's single-minded
focus on investor protection. When a decision can be placed on a
normative scale, such as more or less investor protection, group
decision dynamics will push the group toward a polar end of the
scale. At the SEC, the systematic tendency will be to settle on
outcomes that promise more investor protection. Many investors
may be able t o protect themselves, but the SEC usuallv focuses
on the stereotypical "~vido\vsand orphans" in crafting protections.
The SEC's recent initiative to regulate hedge funds, the investment haven of the ultra-rich, springs to mind. If hedge funds
are not safe for widows and orphans, the SEC must bring them
to heel. Only political pressure is likely to deter the SEC from
seeking the most restrictive alternative.
The SEC's focus on "~rido\vsand orphans" also hclps cxplain
its consistently siding with the plaintiffs' bar. The plaintiffs' bar, of
course, styles itself as the "investors' ad\.ocateVeven morc strongly
than does the SEC. Private class-action litigation has been an
important impetus toward ever more cxpansive intcrpretations
of the anti-fraud rules. With a fcw minor exceptions (somctimes
driven by fear of congressional retribution), thc SEC has sided
with the plaintiffs' bar in the courts. As a somewhat cxaspcrated Justice Powell noted, the "SEC usually favors a11 X.I can't
recall a casc in which this was not so."The SEC has promoted
this cxpansion despite the rcadily apparent ~reakncsscsin the
arguments for invcstor compensation.
Congrcss is of two minds on this issuc. Legislators are opposed
to "frivo1ous litigation," but thcy strongly favor compcnsating thcir
constituents for corporatc fraud, even going so far as to give up
some money that would other\vise go thc U.S. Treasury. Being
of tvro minds is the profit maximizing strategy for members of
Congrcss, as it allows them to extract contributions from the
dccp pockets on both sidcs of the issue.
The SEC's singlc-minded focus on invcstor protection may
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also fuel its aversion to clear rules. Regulated entities and their
la\vyers vastly prefer determinate rules, which allow them
to structure their business dealings in predictable ways. The
SEC, ho~vcver,likes to afford itself lee\rray, promulgating mindnumbingly detailed and correspondingly impenetrable rules, but
preserving discretion to pursue those who \rrould manipulate
those rules for some deceptive purpose. Too much clarity in the
rules is deemed to provide a "roadmap to fraud."And, of course,
the SEC has a very expansive notion of what constitutes fraud,
one seldom bounded by common law understandings of the term.
Those regulated may find the outer limits of the rules only when
they are facing an enforcement action and the SEC is demanding
a settlement. Congress is responsible for the broad rulemalung
delegations that have facilitated thls aversion to clear rules and it
has done nothlng to rein in the SEC's open-ended interpretations
of statutes.
Does coi~gressionaloversight ameliorate this tendency toward
the groupthink of "investor protection"? Not likely; instead,
congressional review tends to push the SEC to skew deliberation over rule proposals to make those rules easier to justifv
to committee chairs and their staffs. If rules are proposed to
satisfy political demands, legislative oversight will induce greater
justification for those rules, but it is unlikely to generate more
thoughtful consideration on the part of reLgulators.Because the
SEC staff will be aware of the preferences of important members
of congressional committees, the staff will tailor reLgulatoryrules
to conform to those preferences.
The confirmation bias can be seen in the path dependence in
the SEC's regulations. As originally enacted in the 193 3 and 1934
Acts, the securities laws provided separate disclosure standards
for companies malung public offerings and those whose securities simply trade on the secondary markets. For several decades
thercafter, commentators recoLpized the need to unify disclosure standards. Disclosures have the same relevance to investors
whether they are purchasing in a public offering or on the
secondary market. The SEC did not seriously consider revamping
the scheme until the 1 960s, ultimately adopting the present
integrated disclosure system. Even that, honrever, falls short of a
full-fledged scheme of companv disclosure. Congress is nowhere
to be found on this issue. Redundant disclosure is imposing a
small but steady drag on the economy, but there is no political hay
to be made in reducing that drag. And it certainly does not rise to
the level of a scandal.

Fixt-t~i~nitn
Dnritln JiscILoswrle
The SEC is not kno\vn for regulatory creativity, often
attempting to tackle difficult problems of corporate governance

with measures invariably derived from some variant of disclosure.
Bribes being paid to foreign government officials?Disclose them!
CEOs being paid obscene sums? Disclose it! Disclosure traditionally has been justified as a means of exposing potentially problematic activities. Justice Louis Brandeis' oft-quoted phrase that
"sunlight . . . is the best disinfectant" provides a succinct summary
of the philosophy behind disclosure. Once investors (and others)
can see such activities clearly, then market participants are less
likely to engage in opportunistic behavior in the first place.
Managers considering a self-dealing transaction, for example,
may choose not to do so if related-party transactions must be
disclosed. In addition to ferreting out agency costs, disclosure
may assist rational investors in allocating their investment dollars,
leading to better use of capital and more accurate securities
prices. So disclosure has much to recommend it as a policy lever
in securities regulation.
But disclosure is far from a panacea. Bounded search at the
SEC may blind regulators to ~ossiblealternatives to disclosure
regulation. In the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals,
the SEC proposed requiring corporate chief executive officers
to certifi corporate financial statements annually. Congress,
anxious to be seen "doing sometlung," followed this proposal 134th
legislation enacting the CEO certification requirement into law.
What &us added to the existing disclosure received by investors
is unclear, but the in terrorem threat posed to CEOs and CFOs is
quite clear. Huge sums are nowTbeing devoted to ensuring that
this "disclosure" is accurate. If it is not, the eexecutix~-.sfear, a flurry
of la\vsuits \rill follo\l; for whch the!. face very real exposure to
personal liability (or, a more remote prospect, an SEC enforcement action or, still more remote, criminal prosecution). Simply
having adequate disclosures is no longer enough; company eexecutives need to disclose about disclosure. And the informational
value to investors of this certification has to be considered quite
dubious. Given these difficulties with disclosure as a regulatory
tool, the SEC's continued reliance on disclosure sugests an
undulv narl-011-search within the SEC.
Disclosure is the tool of choice largely because that is what
Congress has given the SEC. The SEC's regulatory sti-atep reflects
the broad grants of authority to the agency to mandate corporate
disclosures under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Alternatives to disclosure gcnerallv would require the SEC to seek statutory authorization from Congress. To get that authority, however, ~vouldalmost
certainly require the SEC to make an empirical showing to justify
the need for a new regulatory tool. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
provides the SEC wit11 a handful of additional tools, but disclosure
remains the central theme. Even though it relies on disclosure
as the cure-all for the maladies of securities markets, the SEC
LQN Summer 2005
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has done surprisingly little to investigate the impact that disclosure has on those markets. The agency instead prefers to remain
above the grubbiness of empirical data, preferring to ground its
policy prescriptions in "investor confidence."The SEC avoids any
meaningful definition of investor confidence, thereby avoiding the
possibilitv of empirical contradiction. But it also avoids making a
persuasive case to Congress for more creative tools to use against
corporate malfeasance. Congress is unlikely to be creative in t h s
arena on its own, given its generally reactive approach to securities regulation.

Resollatory ~

A ~ ~ U T P

Why do Congress and the SEC lay such heavy burdens on
disclosure as the regulatory workhorse?The answer to that
question takes us to our last shortcoming, regulatory capture.
The SEC tirelessly promotes the myth that individual investors
can be successful in choosing their own stocks, if only they devote
sufficient energy to the voluminous disclosures made available to
them as a result of the wise regulations promulgated by the SEC.
Congress happily endorses the populist notion that every Joe or
Jane Investor can compete with the big boys in picking stocks.
Call it the myth of investor autonomy. Moreover, well informed
shareholders will hold directors to account, and those directors
will in turn keep greedy managers in check. Call this one the
myth of investor sovereignty. The empirical evidence contradicting
both of these notions is overwheIming.
Why do Congress and the SEC perpetuate these myths?
Because the financial services industry requires these myths for its
verv existence. If investors were to switch en masse to index funds
and other forms of passive investment, the Wall Street-industrial complex would crumble. The SEC would lose its reason for
being. And members of Congress fortunate enough to serve on
the Senate Banking Committee and the House Financial Services
Committee \vould lose the steady stream of contributions that
help them maintain their tenure in office. So the m$s of investor
autonomy and investor sovereignty must be maintained.
It would be a mistake to overstate the regulatory capture
story. Industry players fare well in the battle over the content of
securities reLplation when they are enjoying the frothy rise of a
bull market. They are no match, however, for the populist appeal
of protecting defrauded small investors during a bear market,
as discussed above. Overall, thcre is little evidence to show that
the SEC's status as an independent agency has freed it from the
influence of industry capturc. As an agcncy with a s~ccialized
mission, it should come as no surprisc that the subjects of that
regulatory attention have an interest in influencing the agency.
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This \rrould come as no surprise to thc Congress that created
the SEC - enhancing the susceptibility of the regulators to
capture was an important goal behind the creation of the SEC.
Enforcement of the securities law was originally entrusted to
the FederalTrade Commission, which proved less vulnerable to
the influence of the securities industry than the broker-dealer
community desired. The SEC was created as part of the '34 Act a4
a more industry specific regulator that would be more amenable
to the financial services industry.
Although that wish mav have frustrated in the short run, in
the long run, the narrower focus of the SEC relative to the FTC
has made it more vulnerable to capture. The securities industry
has spent considerable lobbying resources to influence the
appointment of commissioners and, of even greater ~i~pificance,
chairmen. Moreover, the financial services industry has considerable influence over the information that the SEC receives as it
undertakes its rulemalung responsibilities. The result has been a
system of securities regulation that largely benefits the big players
in the securities industry. The SEC's protection of fixed commissions in the brokerage industry from the debilitating effects of
competition for nearly half a century is by now a hackneyed
example. And the SEC has dragged its heels in implementing the
National Market System that Congress intended to replace the old
cartel system.The agency continues to struggle to find a place for
proprietary trading systems as the NYSE and NASDAQ resist this
incursion into their comfortable sinecures. It has also been argued
that other aspects of the SEC's regulatory agenda benefit primarily
the brokeragc industry, including much of the detailed disclosure
required of public companies, as well as the contours of insidcr
trading law.
Industry influence has been reinforced by the narrow focus
of the relevant oversight committees in Congress, the Senate
Banlung Committee and the House Financial Services Committee.
As Elena Kagan explains, "When Congress acts in [the sphere
of administration], it docs so through committees and subcommittees highly unrepresentative of the larger institution (let
alone thc nation) and ~i~pificantly
associated with particularized
intcrests."As of the writing of t h s article, 9 of the 5 1 members
of the House subcommittee for securities came from NewYork,
New Jerscy or Connecticut, and 3 out of the 15 members of thc
Senate Subcommittee came from these same three statcs. This
concentration of legislators from the NewYork metropolitan area
is evidence of thc fact that "the one thing the shadow executive
system of the congressional standing committees can guarantcc
us is that the most affected rcgional interests will try to kidnap
thc federal law execution processes that most affcct them."The
remaining legislators on these subcomrnittces, coming from states
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laclang in constituents directly interested in this sector of the

imposed by the SROs could be handed over t o the district courts.

economy, may he less acutely interested in the welfare ofwall

The states could continue to play a role in enforcing the federal

Street. Nonetheless, service on one of these subcommittees is

statutes and regulations devised by Treasury.

a cash cow for these legislators, guaranteed to produce a steady
stream of campaign contributions. Wall Street makes huge invest-

members could be divvied up appropriately between the two

lncnts in influencing the contours of its regulatory environment.
The financial services industry is not the only affected party

Note that I am not suaesting firing the SEC staff - the staff
departments without creating undue confusion. Five commissioners, however, would be loohng for work. I address beloxrr the

that givcs special attention to thcse Icgislative oversight commit-

justifications for the minor blip in unemployment caused by this

tees. The accounting firms and the high-tech sector are also

s\veeping transfer of regulatory authority.

intensely interested. This influence was felt during the 1990s on
the questions of expensing stock options and auditor indepen-

R p x z J a i n r T or~rrr.ea,rt
ion

dence; the SEC backed do\vn in both cases in the face of congres-

Could transferring regulatory authority to the executive

sional opposition. For example, corporations poured millions

branch dampen the rapid swings from regulatory inertia to

of dollars into the campaign war chests of strategically placed
congressmen to head off the Financial Accounting Standards

regulatory hysteria? We have nitnessed a series of largely gardenvarietjl. frauds over the past few years. Companies were making

Board's efforts to require that options grants be accounted for as

up earnings. Analysts were recommending stocks that they

an expense. Congress then bullied the supposedly independent
FASB into submission; the SEC aided and abetted the effort.
The consequences of this interested oversight is that the SEC

to big investors in the form of guaranteed profits through late

thought were crap. Mutual funds were providing s\veetheart deals
trading. The response of the SEC and Congress to the revelation that "There is fraud in our financial markets!" has been a

regulates in the shadow of potential retaliation from Congress.
Legislators on the relevant committees have powerful tools to
bring the agency to heel. If the agency strays too far from the
dominant view on those subcommittees, it risks legislative over-

new rules publicly \velcome them and privately pass the costs
along to investors. To be sure, some of the wrongdoers are now

ruling and worse yet, budget cuts. The bottom line: "Independent"
agencies such as the SEC are not independent of politics; they

facing enforcement actions and criminal prosecution. And the
companies, broker-dealers and mutual funds implicated in the

deluge of new statutes and regulations. Those subject to all these

are hlghly dependent upon the industries that they are charged

sleaze have taken a serious hit in the market, which enforces its

with regulating. That dependency is mediated through Congress,
which uses its mediating role to extract financial support from the

judLgmentsmuch more swiftly and surely than the government
ever could. But sending the bad guys to jail and hammering the
stock price of their employers is never enough. We must punish

financial services industry, accounting firms and public companies.
Good work if you can get it.

r s make sure t h ~ never
s
happens again. I have
the ~ ~ r o n g d o eand
no quarrel with punishing the wrongdoers, but I fear that the

T l w r s r ~ r n n ~ tlhramtrln
iv~
as s~r~nnn-itiirs
regzllpltnr

SEC and Congress will t~picallvbe fighting the last nrar as thev

My proposal is quite simple. The SEC's rulemaking authority

continually expand the Code of Federal Regulations and the

should bc turned ovcr to theTreasury Department, to be overseen
bv the same regulators who oversee other aspects of financial

United States Code in their quest to end fraud. The fraudsters,
I'm afraid, will ahvays be lvith us.

regulation. The SEC's enforcement authority should be turned
ovcr to thc Justicc Department and combined \vith that agency's

Would transferring accountability from the SEC t o the
executive branch help matters?Accountability (or the lack

existing fraud section. Civil and criminal enforcement nrould be

thereon favors the status quo in this context. Although the

consolidated within the same department.
A few administrative details would need to be worked out.

President remains ultimately accountable for policv choices
affecting the securities markets in my model, the transfer of

The adjudications currently processed by the SEC's administra-

authority envisioned in my proposal \rould divide accountability

tive law judges (ALJs) could be turncd olrcr t o ALJs located in

between the Departments of Treasur? and Justice. Unlike the

Treasury, or better still, bc conducted in federal district court.
Thc SEC's supervisory authoritv over the SROs \vould also go to

cominissioners of the SEC, who are responsible for both rulemaking and enforcement, the Secretary of the Treasury and the

Treasury; SROs that failed to fulfill their enforcement obligations

Attorney General lmuld cnch exercise o n l ~
a portion of the

could be referred to Justice. The SEC's powcr to rcvicw sanctions

regulatory authoritv currently wielded bv the SEC. Unlike the
ultimate accountabilit!. hornc by the President, these political
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actors n-ould be accountable only for the regulatory authority
within their respective jurisdwtions. This means that each will be
pointing the finger at the other in the event of regulatory "failure."
Was the scandal of the week the result of insufficiently stringent
rules or a consequence of lax enforcement?
One does not ordinarily consider finger-pointing of this sort
a useful mechanism for encouraging effective regulation. In this
context, holvever, separating enforcement and rulemaking allows
for a healthy bit of indirection and delay. The SEC has no one else
to blame when it is d r a g e d before Congress - Congress has
certainly not been grudging in affording it rulemaking authority,
even if it frequently has been rather tight-fisted with dollars for
enforcement. But Justice andTreasury could blame each other.
"The rules prohibiting this fraud are unclear, so \re can't go
after the bad guys" can be met by "This behavior clearly violates
our anti-fraud rules. Prosecutors should come down hard on
these fraudsters."This is the sort of mutual recrimination that
Washmgton uses a11 the time to deflect calls for change. It is
sometimes disparagingly characterized as "gridlock," but it has an
important stabilizing influence, unless one dunks that every social
ill calls out for a vigorous government response. The President
would be accountable for the trade-off between rulemaking and
enforcement. Congress is likely to t h n k twice before it calls him
before a subcommittee for a lecturing on regulator? priorities and
the critical need to protect widows and orphans. Simply put, the
President is too busy for that. By contrast, commissioners of the
SEC, most assuredly, are not.
If Congress wanted to make its influence felt, it would have
to go through the tedious and time-consuming process of
drafting legislation, finding a majority coalition to vote for it, and
the President to sign the resulting bill into law. The
marginal cost of this effort is substantially greater than bullying
the SEC. Perhaps Congress, too, would then find better thmgs to
do.

Task diversit?

and

di~7ersit~

The Secretary of theTreasury has a lot of irons in the fire.
According to the department's Website, "The mission of the
Department of the Treasury is to promote the conditions for
prosperity and stabilit). in the United States and encourage prosperity and stability in the rest of the world."That's a big job. More
concretely, the Treasury is responsible for:
Managing federal finances;
Collecting taxes, duties and monies paid to and due to the
United States and paying all bills of the United States;
Producing postage stamps, currency and coinage;
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Managing government accounts and the public debt;
Supervising national banks and thrift institutions;
Advising on domestic and international financial, monetary,
economic, trade, and tax policy;
Enforcing federal finance and tax laws;
Investigating and prosecuting tax evaders, counterfeiters,
and forgers.
This diversity of tasks encourages a diversity of perspcctives among the top officials at theTreasury. Although all of the
senior staff are likely to have expertise in one or more of these
areas, it is unlikely that any one of these areas will predominate.
Consequently, when it comes time to decide important policy
matters, the Secretary will be getting advice from people with
a broad range of backgrounds. For the Secretary and the rest
of theTreasury staff, it is hard to have a single-minded focus on
saving widows and orphans from the vipers ofwall Street when
you have so many tasks that require your attention. Investor
protection \vould continue to be an important goal for aTreasury
Department charged with regulating the securities markets,
but so would capital formation, diversification of the outlets for
financial services to consumers, and cooperation with foreign
regulators.
To be sure, under my proposal, many members of the Trcasury
staff will specialize in the regulation of the securities markets, but
their proposals will face the scrutiny of superiors not suffused
in the culture of investor protection. And promotion within the
department is unlikely to be a lock-step progression - a person
who shows talent in the field of banking or tax might bc tappcd
for an important role in regulating the securitics markets. Going
higher up the chain, Republicans and Democrats would switch
places in the politically-appointed slots as power shiftcd in the
White House. The result would be less homogeneity, broader
search and more critical thinlung generally.
So too, with the Justicc Department. The Attorney Gencral
has at least as broad a range of concerns as thc Secretary of the
Treasury -locking up terrorists, fighting the war on drugs,
prosecuting environmental polluters, etc. Going down to the
trenches, thc FBI special agent who shows talent in making a case
against Medicare fraudsters may wcll have talent for unraveling
the machinations of accounting fraudsters. Fraud is fraud, and
the expertise of the SEC staff can easily be oversold. The Justice
Department has many lawyers and investigators who are proficient at prosecuting securities fraud (e.g., the fraud unit of the
U. S. Attorney's office in the Southern District of Ncw York) .
There would be many more such professionals if the Justice
Department took over civil enforcemcnt of the securities laws
along with the criminal authority that it already exercises. But
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cxpcrtisc must bc balanccd against diversity of perspective, ant1 it
is hard to imagine any state of thc \vorld in which the SEC would
surpass Justice on diversity.
Morc importantly, the lawyers at Justice are more likely to
view thc rcgulations promulgated by Trcasury with a critical
eye. Although both dcpartmcnts are nominally components of
thc executive branch, they have distinct histories and cultures.
Lawyers at Justice are much less likely to buy in to the work of
Treasury than SEC enforcement attorneys are to buy in to the
work of the Divisions of Market Regulation or Corporate Finance.
The lawyers in the executive branch arc on the same side, but
not the same team. Justice is unlikely to suffer from confirmation
bias in reviewing the proposals ofTreasury; it is not their work,
after all. The division between the two departments also matters
for those discussions of enforcement policy in slightly shabby
conference rooms at Justice o r theTreasury. Clear rules may be
a "roadmap to fraud," but it is much easier to s h o ~ vviolations of
them in court. The skepticism with which the Solicitor General's
office has treated some of the SEC's more cockamamie theories
affords a concrete example.
Lawyers at the Justice Department are also more likely to
be skeptical of the need for class action litigation and investor
compensation. The SEC's support for the plaintiffs' bar helps
the agency with the more populist element in Congress, but the
Justice Department kno\vs that deterrence is really the critical
element in minimizing the social costs of fraud. Fraudsters need
to go to jail and pay hefty fines; what happens to the money
afterward is, at best, a sidesho~v.

course, are notoriously wary of blaming even foolhardy victims
for thcir plight (think of the Enron employees), despite the inexpensive self-help that they could haw adopted. "This all could have
been avoided with a bit more disclosure!" O r a bit of diversification. It is doubtful that a politician in the White House would
be willing to blame the victim any more than Congress and the
SEC. Policy will continue to focus on throwing the books at the
wrongdoers.
But will the President follo\lr~condemnation of the bad guys
with a slew of new disclosure requirements to address last year's
fraud?The President has the advantage of being able to rely on the
strong rhetorical message sent by actual criminal prosecutions.
The SEC's civil enforcement po\trers look rather tame by comparison to hard time. Congress has only the ability to write additional
rules. Congress can, of course, ratchet the jail time up another
couple notches, but most maximum penalties in the securities
area are already \\?ellpast the point of diminishing marginal deterrence and, \verse yet, obviouslv so. No one is impressed anymore
bv another five to ten potential years of jail time for white-collar
criminals after the first ten to twent)l. Martha Stewart's six
months in prison will be quite sufficient to deter her from lying
to the government in the future. Neither Congress nor the SEC
has the satisfving po\trer of throwing the fraudsters in jail. Used
agppessivel\; the authority to prosecute could satiate the public
clamor to do something without imposing an additional burden of
disclosure costs on all the business that did not break the law and
should not be ~ u n i s h e dT. h s may not satisfi the hue and
for
government intervention in extreme cases, but a few 11-ell-placed
"perp walks" can help deflect the demand for additional disclosure

Fixationn WiltL dli5flo~~~r~

requirements.

Can a transfer of authority to the esecutive branch stimulate
more creative thinking about regulatory responses to malfeasance
by corporate officers and financial serviccs profcssionals! Rccall
my argument that the Congress and the SEC focus almost exclusivelv on disclosure because it reinforces the myths of investor
autonomy and sovereiLpty,a very lucrative mvth as far as the
financial serviccs sector is concerned.
Would the Treasury and the President be equally enamored
of this myth of the cmpo~vcrcdinvestor?To be sure, the financial
serviccs industry is a major contri1,utor to presidential as \yell as
congressional campaigns, so disclosure has continued appeal. But
the lines of accountability for ultimate policy choices would be
clarified somcnrhat wit11 a transfer of authority to the executive
branch. A risk-averse President who wanted to a\.oid a political
backlash from the next bull market would strongly favor a welldiversified electorate. The real storics of pain in a inarkct decline
arc from thc poor souls ~ v h oarc undcr-diversified. Politicians, of

R p R ~ x l ao tr v rnptnlrp
Would a transfer of authority t o the executive branch make a
significant dent in the extent of regulator\. capture? Of the four
concerns identified here, this onc carries the least weight; it would
he insufficient standing alone to justifv transferring r e p l a t o r v
authority to the executive branch. The principal effect of such a
transfer on the usual pattcrn of "Inside-the-Beltlvav" rcnt seeking
would be to simply shift some of the power to extract rents
-regulated industries from members of Congress lvould have
a bit less, and the Prcsidcilt \\.auld have a bit more.The financial
s e r ~ ~ i cindustr!,
es
already tries to curry favor with the President
in ordcr to influence the choicc of con~n~issioners
and to be ablc
to call upon thc President's aid in the lawmahng process (rither
to instigate, or vcto, legislation). Giving the Prcsident a u t h o r i ~
over rulemaking would enhance thc President's attractil-encss as
recipient of lobbying largesse. By contrast, lobb\ing to influence
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the Justice Department's enforcement agenda would be very
tricky business; not many White House staffers would enjoy
waking up to read in the il'ashington Port about influence peddling
related to Justice Department fi-aud prosecutions. On balance,
I think the overall shft would be to make members of Congress
less attractive and the President more attractive, but rent seelung,
like fraud, will always be with US.
Despite these caveats, I think that my proposal would achieve
some limited success in difhsing the effect of lobbying expendtures. Members of the House and Senate subcommittees for
securities that do not have a substantial number of constituents in
the financial services industry have little to constrain them from
offering their votes and influence to the highest interested bidder.
The voters back home in Wyoming will have little interest in
their representative's vote on reforming the market structure for
buying and selling securities. In that vacuum of electoral interest,
campaiLpcontributions (which can be used to pay for the television ads to reach all those voters spread so thinly across the state)
can be very persuasive indeed.
The President, by contrast, has many constituencies to whch
he must answer and is unlikely to be able to give decisive weight
to any one interest group. Simply put, it costs more to buy a
President than a legislator, even a well-placed one. Moreover,
it is harder for lobbyists to gain access to the President, given
the demands on his time. To be sure, the White House staff and
Treasun Department officials are likely to be more responsive,
but they too will have diverse constituencies to which they need
to attend on the President's behalf. Congressional committee
members will still have a role to play in influencing policy, but
they carry substantially less of a threat in a conflict with the
executive branch than they do with the SEC. The President, as a
roughly co-equal actor in the legislative and budgetary processes,
can fight back if a department's budget is threatened; the SEC has
to grin and take it. A transfer to the executive branch will not
eliminate concerns over re$atory capture, but it might slow
do\\m by a step or two the interest groups attempting to capture
regulatory policy.
More importantly, the accountability for tailoring regulation
to suit interest groups would be clear. Under the current regime,
Congress can bully the SEC into caving in when faced with
interest group pressure and no member of Congress will face any
serious threat of reprisal (as with Congress' derailing of expensing
for options). There is safety in numbers. If the President overrules
rules proposed by the Treasury staff, the responsibility will be
clear. If new rules are warranted, the President who nixes them
would face a considerably more substantial risk of political embarrassment than would an individual congressman.
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As the SEC marks its 70th anniversary, the survival of securities regulation, and the federal government's role in that regulation, are no longer in doubt (if they ever were). Federal securities
regulation is here to stay; proposals to do away with it are unlikely
to garner much support anytime soon.
I have made a more modest proposal: transferring that
authority over securities regulation to the executive branch. The
main impetus behind my call for reform is that the SEC is "independent" in name only. The agency's dependence on Congress has
some unfortunate consequences for the path of regulatory policy
in the field of securities. Specifically, far from dampening the
boom and bust cycle in securities regulation, the SEC -under
the watchful eye of Congress -has fueled the cyclical swings in
regulatory policy as a means of gaining additional authority and
budgetary support. Congress and the SEC have fed off each institution's cognitive biases. Most destructively for investor welfare,
both institutions have perpetuated the twin myths of investor
autonomy and investor sovereignty. Finall!, vesting regulatory
authority in the SEC has facilitated agency capture and enhanced
the ability of members of Congress to extract rents from the
securities industry, the accounting profession, and others affected
by securities regulation.
I have argued that the executive branch might be somewhat
less subject to these maladies if we were to vest authority over
securities regulation in theTreasury and Justice Departments. I
am far from claiming that regulatory "perfection" (whatever that
would mean) would follow if my proposal were implemented.
More modest improvements, however, might come about.
Transferring authority might dampen the regulatory over-reaction
that follows in the wake of bear markets. The Treasury and Justice
Departments would almost certainly bring greater diversity of
perspective to addressing the problems of corporate governance
and the securities markets. Those departments might view more
skeptically the claim that disclosure solves everything. And my
proposal might reduce the extent of agency capture at the margin
(but only at the margin).
Is my proposal to transfer regulatory authority over the sccurities markets to the executive branch as far-fetched as Jonathan
Macey's call to end federal securities regulation altogether? It
might appear so at first blush.The SEC is busier than ever, bettcr
funded than ever, and has more support generally in Congress
than it has enjoyed any time in recent memory. Moreover, there
are powerful constituencies that have come to rely on the SEC
for thcir professional livelihood. Corporate lawyers, for example,
would strenuously resist thc abolition of the SEC. I am a natural-
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born pessimist, so I freely concede that my proposal is unlikely to
be adopted anytime soon.
The one constant in securities regulation is that the political
fortunes of the SEC generally ebb and flow with the cycles of
the market. The correlation is inverse, however, so the SEC rides
high when the Dow Jones Industrial Average rides low. But within
that broader correlation there is some variance in the support for
the SEC. When the market is first hitting the downward trend
in its cycle, support for the SEC may dip along with the major
indices. In one of those future dips - who can predict when it
will come - may arise the opportunity for the sort of administrative reform proposed here. To be sure, the relevant committees
in Congress will cling tenaciously to their "independent" agency,
but sometimes the political imperative to "do somethng" can
overcome even entrenched institutional self-interest. It would be
a poor bet to try to handicap a retirement date for the SEC, but it
might be almost as speculative to count on the agency's staving on
the job forever.
I
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